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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010 the spill mitigation 
response focused heavily on coastal protection, a method recommended by 
government scientists—despite the fact that the majority of the spill was 
contained in the water column and never threatened the coast. A few months into 
the spill, the response policy shifted to include deepwater dimensions, something 
independent scientists had been advocating from the start. The aim for this thesis 
is to understand how the shift in response policy occurred. By drawing on 
Christina Boswell’s theory of the political uses of expert knowledge, and John 
Kingdon’s multiple streams framework, I conducted a case study of the 
knowledge utilization during the Deepwater Horizon response. I found that the 
policy shift was a shift not in the use of expert knowledge, but a shift in the 
problem understanding—which provided an opening for subsurface oil to become 
part of the policy—hence the policy shift. I also found that the decision makers 
might have been more reluctant to consider suggestions provided by the 
independent scientists, since only when government scientists conducted their 
own testing which verified the independent scientists’ findings were these 
considered. 
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1   Introduction 
 
In the evening of April 20 2010 an explosion occurred onboard the Deepwater 
Horizon (DWH) oil rig drilling into the Macondo well at the bottom of the Gulf of 
Mexico outside the coast of Louisiana. Eleven workers were killed in the 
explosion and seventeen suffered injuries, and to make matters worse, April 20 
was the day representatives from BP and Transocean—the leasers and owners of 
the rig, respectively—were onboard DWH to celebrate seven years without an 
accident (Hammer – Schleifstein 2010). When the rig sank on April 22, the largest 
marine oil spill in U.S. history, nineteen times that of the Exxon Valdez oil spill of 
1989, followed in its wake (CNN 2010; Adams – Gabbatt 2010; Bond 2013:696). 
Five million barrels (equal to approximately 800 million liters; the volume of 320 
Olympic size swimming pools) of crude oil leaked into the deep ocean during the 
three months it took to stop the flow of oil. Another two months would pass 
before the well could be sealed permanently on September 19 2010, five months 
after the explosion (Sveriges Radio 2010; DARRP 2018). Dubbed the largest 
environmental disaster in U.S. history, it is also the incident which has prompted 
the largest response efforts (Barron 2012:315). Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy 
during the time of the disaster, writes: “At its peak, efforts to stem the spill and 
combat its effects included more than 47,000 personnel; 7,000 vessels; 120 
aircraft; and the participation of scores of federal, state, and local agencies” 
(2010:2). But in this thesis the focus is narrower, focusing only on the scientists 
who aided in the oil spill cleanup.  
David Bond, whose subject of study is oil spills and their impact on 
environmental science and governance (Bennington College 2018), describes a 
shift in response policy during the DWH oil spill, from a tight focus on protection 
of the coastlines and tried and tested methods for mitigating the oil, to deepwater 
as an environment of interest. Promoting these policies were government 
scientists on one side, and independent scientists on the other (Bond 2013:700, 
703). The policy shift raised questions about how it can be understood, and how 
different usages of expert knowledge might come to shed light on the shift in 
policy. 
After the arrival of the new millennium an increase in the demand for 
evidence-based policy can be detected in countries like the U.K. (Boswell 2009:3; 
Parsons 2002:43–44), paralleled by a similar development in the U.S. (CEP 
2017:1; Mancini – Mears 2013:1117). This trend is consistent with one of the 
strongest prevailing theories of knowledge utilization: the instrumentalist 
account—a theory which emphasizes expert knowledge as having a problem-
solving function in policymaking (Boswell 2009:4; Weiss 1979:429–430). 
Scholars like Carol Weiss and Paul Sabatier have critiqued the instrumentalist 
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account, and explored alternative uses, like the symbolic use of expert knowledge 
(Boswell 2009:3–5, 35). Upon these theories Christina Boswell, whom I’ll return 
to again in this thesis, built her theory of the political uses of expert knowledge, 
which develops the ideas about the symbolic use even further (2009:5–6). On 
another note, Thomas Birkland, political scientist, has studied disasters, 
sometimes called focusing events—a term borrowed from John Kingdon, whom 
we’ll also return to later. He shows that during oil spills in particular, it’s in the 
interest of the involved parties—whether government, private sector or action 
groups—to promote their specific narrative of the spill, to push their preferred 
policy proposals forward. Thus, competition in who gets to control the narrative is 
to be expected (1997:105), and a possible way to get ahead of the game is to bring 
in experts to help. 
1.1   Objective and research questions 
My objective is to create an understanding for how expert knowledge was utilized 
by the U.S. government in the cleanup after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and 
how this can inform the understanding of the policy shift, from methods for 
coastal protection to deepwater oil mitigation, that occurred. I hope to shed light 
on the ways in which expert knowledge can be utilized during a crisis, a very 
particular time where decisions need to be made quickly. My research questions 
are the following: Is the shift a shift in the type of knowledge use? How did this 
shift occur? 
1.2   Disposition 
In the next chapter, chapter two, my theoretical framework consisting of 
Boswell’s theory of knowledge utilization and Kingdon’s multiple streams 
framework will be laid out. My methodological choices and challenges are 
presented in chapter three, and chapter four contains the analysis and is split into 
the three streams of Kingdon’s multiple streams framework: the problem stream, 
the policy stream and the political stream. In the fifth and final chapter I’ll discuss 
the findings presented in the analysis, present my conclusions, and propose areas 
for future research. 
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2   Theory 
2.1   The political uses of expert knowledge 
In her book The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge (2009) Christina Boswell 
develops a theory of the different uses of expert knowledge, by delving into the 
apparent puzzle that exists in the relation between the instrumentalist account of 
expert knowledge and what role expert knowledge seem to actually play in 
politics. By challenging the instrumentalist account, she develops her theory 
which states that expert knowledge isn’t predominantly drawn on to improve 
policy (2009:3–4, 7). 
Before delving any deeper into Boswell’s theory of knowledge utilization her 
definitions of expert and expert knowledge need to be made clear, since there is 
some contestation of who can be deemed an expert. Boswell claims to use a fluid 
definition of expert knowledge stating that the definition varies with the 
knowledge politicians, advisors and such, are drawing on. However, she does 
point out two features usually found in expert knowledge. The first is in reference 
to the experts themselves. Expert knowledge is held by those classified as 
experts—persons employed at research institutes or holding specialist posts within 
organizations. The second refers to how said knowledge is produced. In order to 
be accepted as expert knowledge, the research needs to have been conducted in 
accordance with established methodologies, and the arguments need to be 
logically sound (2009:23–25). It seems as though she equates expert knowledge 
with research, not only because she uses the terms interchangeably (2009:4n7). 
With this in mind it’s unclear just how fluid her definition is, but it seems unlikely 
that it would stretch far enough to include lay-experts, described by Steven 
Epstein (1995:409) among others. However, this does not pose much of a 
challenge for this study in particular since the expert knowledge in question in the 
DWH case coincides with Boswell’s description. 
According to the instrumentalist account, expert knowledge is valued and used 
in politics in order to improve the political output—to generate the best results. 
Though this both matches the self-perception of policy makers, and the ideal of 
evidence-based policy, expert knowledge doesn’t seem to be used in this way 
most of the time. On the basis of this apparent gap between research and de facto 
policy, Boswell challenges the instrumentalist view. She puts forward an 
alternative theory which suggests that expert knowledge has a symbolic value and 
use in politics, in contrast to the problem-solving role it’s given in the 
instrumentalist account. She highlights two symbolic functions for expert 
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knowledge, a legitimizing and substantiating one, which I will present below 
(2009:3–5), but first, a closer look at the instrumentalist account. 
For a long time, the instrumentalist account has reigned sovereign, not just in 
the realm of literature on knowledge utilization, but also as an ideal among 
policymakers, evident in the demand for evidence-based policy. Succinctly, it’s a 
way to use the expertise and science available in order to create the best policies 
and outcomes possible—here lies the need to use available information of what 
has been proven to work. Policymakers are therefore said to be eager to improve 
policy when possible, and doing so by drawing on research to fill the gaps in their 
knowledge of the situation (Boswell 2009:3–5, 30). 
To better understand why knowledge has different uses Boswell makes a 
distinction between two different types of organizations who each use knowledge 
in a different way from the other. She makes the suggestion that organizations 
might seek legitimacy through three different means: their talk, decisions, or 
action. She borrows a distinction made by Nils Brunsson (2002) of two different 
types of organizations which serve as ideal types in her theory: action 
organizations and political organizations. What the two types have in common is 
their desire to secure legitimacy from their environment, the difference is the way 
they seek to do it. Action organizations derive legitimacy from their output, 
meaning they’re judged on their societal impact—in sum, how well they perform 
or meet their goals. Therefore, they have an incentive to use the available expert 
knowledge to improve their output and their results—thus using knowledge in an 
instrumental way. Political organizations, on the other hand, derive legitimacy 
through their talk and decisions—in other words, their behavior. When an 
organization is not primarily judged on its results, but instead its process, there is 
little incentive to use expert knowledge to improve output. Instead, political 
organizations are inclined to use expert knowledge symbolically, in a legitimizing 
or substantiating way. It should be added that action organizations sometimes use 
knowledge in a substantiating manner too, if the topic is particularly contested 
(Boswell 2009:13, 47–48), what exactly this entails will be touched on below.  
In the words of Boswell, expert knowledge is used symbolically when “/.../ 
knowledge is not being valued for its content, but rather as a way of signaling the 
authority, validity and legitimacy of organizational decisions, structures or 
practices” (2009:61). As mentioned earlier, she describes two different symbolic 
functions knowledge can serve: a legitimizing function and a substantiating 
function. The first she argues, is most likely to occur within political organizations 
as they’re the ones striving to prove their legitimacy by meeting the expectations 
of their environment by tailoring the organization’s norms and formal structure to 
fit those expectations (2009:61–62). Commissioning, performing, collecting, and 
openly valuing research are ways for organizations to show their rationality, and 
through these actions they can gain legitimacy. This type of knowledge utilization 
is symbolic in the sense that the content of the knowledge itself takes a backseat—
what is important is that the organization is believed to be valuing and being in 
possession of expert knowledge (Boswell 2009:87–88). 
The second type of symbolic use laid out by Boswell is the substantiating 
function of expert knowledge. Not reserved for either of the two organizational 
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types, but rather for any organization operating in a highly contested area. In such 
a situation it can be useful for an organization to call on expert knowledge in 
support of their claims or policies to show how they’re supported by scientific 
findings, even if the opposite view has equal, but different, scientific support. This 
lends authority to the organization’s own proposals and can undermine those of 
their rivals (2009:7–8, 61–62, 87). 
In summary, Boswell critiques the instrumentalist function of expert 
knowledge utilization as the sole function of knowledge in politics, in reference to 
the observed gap between research findings and policy. She offers up her own 
theory of knowledge utilization which includes two types of symbolic functions of 
knowledge use, the legitimizing function, and the substantiating function. Further, 
she argues that these different uses, or functions, will be employed by different 
types of organizations. Political organizations, which gain legitimacy from their 
processes and talk, are likely to use knowledge in the legitimizing way, whereas 
action organizations, which gain legitimacy from their results are the ones likely 
to use knowledge instrumentally. In contested policy areas either organizational 
type might use knowledge to substantiate their proposals or decisions (2009:7).  
Boswell’s starting point—the gap between outspoken need for science-
informed policy and political outcome, or put differently, the lack of instrumental 
knowledge use—has slight parallels to arguments made by John Kingdon, whose 
theory of agenda setting will be presented in full below. These theories find 
common ground in how they understand knowledge utilization in politics. 
Boswell argues that even though knowledge is valued for its instrumental 
function, and in high demand among politicians, it most often serves other uses—
symbolic ones (2009:7). Expert knowledge not being drawn on to shape the best 
solutions coincides with Kingdon’s understanding of the policy making process, 
with problems and solutions formed separately, only to be attached later on 
(2003:19). 
2.2   The multiple streams framework 
Building on Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen’s A Garbage Can 
Model of Organizational Choice (1972), John Kingdon developed his multiple 
streams framework (MSF), first laid out in Agendas, Alternatives, and Public 
Policies from 1984 (2003). Over thirty years later it still remains one of the most 
influential theories in policy literature (Rawat – Morris 2016:605). The multiple 
streams framework, first developed to describe the process of agenda setting and 
policy formation (Kingdon 2003:xix), has been proven useful for analysis of a 
number of different aspects of the policy process (Béland – Howlett 2016:224), 
such as the framing of issues (Corbett 2011; Maltby 2013), and decision making 
(Knaggård 2009:99; Wan et al. 2013; Zahariadis 2014:25)—the latter ones being 
examples of how the MSF is going to be applied in this thesis. I’ve made the 
decision to use the MSF in the analysis of the DWH disaster by dividing the 
surrounding aspects of the case—such as policy proposals and political climate—
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into its corresponding stream. In this section an overview of Kingdon’s account of 
the MSF will be presented with a focus on the characteristics of the three streams: 
the problem stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream. 
The MSF was developed to understand, as Kingdon himself puts it, how 
political issues “got to be issues in the first place” (2003:xvii). It’s a theory of 
agenda setting aiming to understand how certain issues manage to garner the 
attention of government officials while other issues seem to lack the ability to 
generate the same engagement. Three separate streams make up Kingdon’s 
version of the policy process, the streams are as aforementioned: the problem 
stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream—flowing simultaneously, and 
existing independently from one another (2003:xvii). 
The problem stream focuses on how a condition becomes a political problem. 
Kingdon highlights how a problem is created, or defined, when we identify a 
condition we deem in need of fixing. Not all conditions are problems, after all, 
conditions like bad weather aren’t usually of political concern (2003:109), unless 
it’s of a very extreme nature. There are indicators—quantifiable characteristics, 
like a rise in the unemployment rate—that can signal a problem is on the rise. This 
does not mean that there will be agreement on how the problem should be 
understood. Some of these indicators, like the unemployment rate, are monitored 
continuously, but a one-off scientific study showing a trend of a drop in high 
school graduates could also serve as an indicator (2003:91–93). 
However, problems aren’t always realized with the help of indicators, 
sometimes other phenomena bring them into view. One of these phenomena is 
what Kingdon has termed a focusing event. Common examples of this are 
attention-grabbing events, like accidents, crises and disasters (2003:94–95). For 
example, in 2012 a visually impaired 71-year-old in Coventry, England, was hit 
by a bus in a shared space intersection—an intersection purposefully without 
traffic lights or signage, intended to encourage drivers and pedestrians to cross 
cautiously. The man later died in hospital from the injuries he sustained during the 
accident (BBC 2012; Senthilingam 2014). This drew attention to the apparent 
inaccessibility and danger shared space schemes posed, especially to select 
members of the public such as the visually impaired, and a ban on all new 
construction of shared space schemes was called for by a member of the House of 
Lords (Bawden 2015). A focusing event could also be based on the personal 
experiences of a policy maker (Kingdon 2003:94–95), which ties in to the shared 
space example since the member of the House of Lords that brought it to attention 
was Lord Holmes, the only blind member of the house (Coleman 2015). While the 
terrible accident was part of the focusing event, it’s also likely that Lord Holmes’ 
personal experiences played a part in bringing the issue to attention. 
The final way in which a problem can be brought to attention according to 
Kingdon is through feedback on existing programs. The feedback can be in form 
of evaluations, complaints, and the like, and shed light on problems such as 
unforeseen consequences and high costs (2003:100–101). In sum, it’s through 
either indicators, focusing events, or feedback conditions become problems. 
Against what might be instinct to many, Kingdon suggests that policy 
proposals, or solutions, are fashioned independently from the problems they might 
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become attached to. Put differently, once a problem is realized, the next step is not 
to build a solution from scratch, but to identify one already out there (2003:143). 
This stream of ideas is what makes up Kingdon’s policy stream. 
In communities of specialists, whether scientists or government staffers, ideas 
float around in what Kingdon likens to an evolutionary process of natural 
selection, where some ideas succumb, some combine with others, and only some 
adapt and thrive (2003:116–117). The ideas have to change in order to fit with 
various criteria posed by those involved in the policymaking process, like 
scientists and government officials. This group is also known as the policy 
community, and among the criteria for survival are being technically feasible and 
in accordance with the values of the community (2003:143). Driving the evolution 
forward are what he calls policy entrepreneurs, people from both inside, and 
outside of government, advocating for different policy proposals. They also 
perform the function of attaching policies to the appropriate problem (2003:122–
124, 205). Ideas are rarely accepted at face value and the policy entrepreneurs 
play an important role in what Kingdon calls the “softening up” process—getting 
the policy community used to the new ideas. If an idea meets the appropriate 
criteria and survives long enough for the policy community to see it as a feasible 
option it ends up on the short list of ideas, ready to be considered by policy 
makers (2003:139). 
When Kingdon speaks of politics he does so with a narrow definition in mind 
which includes government, elections, pressure groups and so on (2003:145), it’s 
then only natural for his definition of the political stream follows this definition. 
Changes in the political realm have consequences. It goes without saying that 
something like a change of administration can affect the makeup of the political 
agenda. Even more abstract phenomena like a change in the national mood—the 
public’s attitude which directs what it finds acceptable—has the power to shape 
the agenda according to Kingdon (2003:162–163). 
As stated, the problems, policies, and politics stream flow independently from 
one another. Once in a while however, a policy window will open and allow for 
the joining, or in Kingdon’s words coupling, of the streams. A policy window is 
characterized by conditions that are extra beneficial for the pushing forward of 
certain ideas. They can open when something happens that changes the 
conditions—like when a change in administration occurs, since a new 
administration might favor ideas rejected by the former, or when a focusing event 
gives policy entrepreneurs an issue to attach their policies to. In short, an issue 
will become joined to a solution, or vice versa, and then on joined to the 
appropriate forces in the political stream, and it’s this that pushes the idea onto the 
political agenda. It’s fully possible for an issue to make its way onto the 
governmental agenda without having a solution, or policy, attached. Nonetheless, 
in order for the issue to make it to the decision agenda, it almost always have to 
come with a policy suggestion (2003:194–195). 
To summarize, Kingdon’s MSF makes sense of agenda setting by dividing 
aspects of the policy process into the separate streams of problems, policies, and 
politics. The problem stream deals with how conditions are framed as political 
issues by indicators, focusing events, or feedback; in the policy stream proposals 
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have to survive an evolutionary process in order to be considered, sometimes 
helped by policy entrepreneurs; the political stream is made up by political 
institutions and the public and emphasizes how changes in these affect what has 
the possibility to rise on the agenda. When a policy window opens the streams can 
couple and propel issues to the governmental agenda, or if attached with the 
appropriate policy, the decision agenda (2003:18–20, 194–195). 
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3   Methods and source material 
This study is built as a case study of expert knowledge utilization in the oil 
mitigation efforts carried out by the U.S. government during the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill. I believe the case study to be the most fitting research method, 
given my research objective and question, since one of the major strengths of the 
case study its ability to generate a good understanding of the case itself (Merriam 
1994:184). If I were to attempt a comparative study of say, knowledge utilization 
during different disasters I might be able to find common characteristics, but 
without great detail, and detail is of interest to me here since I’m curious as to 
how the specific policy shift in the DWH case can be understood. 
A common challenge to the case study method is its suggested inability to 
generate broad statements about similar cases, since such generalizations are 
difficult to make from studying one, or a few, cases alone. While this critique is 
valid, and should be taken into careful consideration, it poses less of a threat for a 
study with the ambition to understand, as opposed to an ambition to explain. I 
believe the case study to be the best choice for my thesis since this method will 
allow me to make close observations and enable me to see the important details 
much more clearly. While generalizations made from case studies aren’t generally 
looked upon favorably, it’s not impossible for a case study to generate questions 
in want of testing on other cases in the future. 
I’ve chosen to split the analysis into the three streams of Kingdon’s multiple 
streams framework, a fitting choice given that the theory is developed from 
studies of the U.S., and should therefore suit the case I’ve chosen. Kingdon 
himself does not believe agenda setting to be a straightforward process, instead he 
paints a picture of an evolutionary process where the strongest ideas survive 
(2003:2–4). By not too far a stretch of the imagination—and argued by scholars 
presented in the theory section—one could believe this to be true for the decision 
making process as well, where multiple understandings of the issue and solutions 
have to be considered. To make sense of this process—or rather the three parallel 
processes of problems, policy and politics—I’ve chosen to structure my thesis 
after Kingdon’s multiple streams framework, and analyze the events in each 
stream separately. Doing this allows me to get a closer view of each of the 
streams, and enables a more precise application of Boswell’s theory of knowledge 
utilization in the different realms of the policy process. While the DWH response 
involved many people and spanned many areas, not all of this will be covered 
here. I’ve chosen to limit myself to the clean-up process surrounding the spill, as 
this is where the policy shift in question occurred. This means that the experts in 
question are oceanographers, marine scientists and environmental scientists, and 
therefore this thesis excludes the engineers who advised on source control 
operations (Lubchenco et al. 2012:20212–20214; McNutt et al. 2012:20222). 
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The source material for this thesis come in a variety of forms. The material is 
made up by government sources, such as reports by government agencies or 
commissions, memorandums or other correspondence between agencies or 
persons in charge, government websites, press releases or statements; scholarly 
publications, both from scientists directly involved in the response or as expert 
advisors, and from scholars studying the events from the outside; and newspaper 
articles available online. For the sake of the integrity of this thesis I’ve done my 
best to ensure the reputability of each source by using information from trusted 
newspapers, peer reviewed publications and respected government sources. The 
material I’ve had access to haven’t given me full insight into the process, I do not 
have knowledge of what has been said during meetings among the scientists and 
politicians, apart from what has been published in studies by other scholars, and 
what has been said in interviews with the press. For this reason, interviews with 
some of the involved scientists would have strengthened the material on which 
this thesis stands. However, I do still believe the depiction I’ve produced here to 
be accurate, given the varied source material. As for if what the scientists are 
describing in the interviews I’ve been able to access is an accurate recollection of 
events, I’m unable to be a true judge of—seeing as I lack the aforementioned 
insight. However, what can be expected of them is a will to get their story across. 
The two seemingly warring groups of scientists, which will be laid out in more 
detail later on, can be expected to want their side of the story heard. Thus, in the 
instances where they’ve been subject to interview I expect them to have given 
their true version of how they experienced the events. 
The analysis draws on theories by Kingdon and Boswell and is split three 
ways, according to the MSF. First, in order to be able to examine the events more 
closely I divided the source material into its corresponding stream. Material 
concerning the disaster as an event, professing its status as a disaster, and 
discussions on the understanding of the problem was sorted into the problem 
stream. Material concerning proposed solutions, advocates for different solutions, 
and the like, were sorted into the policy stream. Finally, material concerning the 
political climate, such as the president’s will to run for re-election, and the 
concern with legitimacy, were sorted into the political stream. 
Second, I had to examine each of the streams to understand how, and thirdly 
by whom, expert knowledge was being used. I was able to do this by using 
Boswell’s theory of knowledge utilization. I chose to recognize an organization as 
an action organization if it’s likely to prioritize results over a legitimate process. 
Unified Command, of which a description will be given in the next chapter, is the 
action organization discussed in this thesis. I’ve classified organizations as 
political organizations when they can be expected to be mainly concerned with 
legitimacy, rather than results. This rings true for the president and those closest 
to him, which will also be touched on in the chapter that follows. 
In order to judge which function—instrumental or symbolic—the expert 
knowledge serves in each case the organizational types can normally serve as a 
guide, but I didn’t want to rely on that since organizations don’t always behave in 
the expected way (Boswell 2009:49). I’ve identified the knowledge use as 
instrumental when expert knowledge has been implemented into policy in a fairly 
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straightforward way. I’ve chosen to identify the knowledge use as symbolic when 
drawing on expert knowledge is referenced in the organization’s talk, but the 
actual decisions deviate from expert opinion—when seemingly drawing on expert 
knowledge is more a way of paying lip service to the organization’s environment. 
Further, I’ve classified the knowledge utilization as substantiating when the 
organization makes references to science for policy in their talk and the policy 
area in question is highly contested among experts. When the policy area lacks 
this contestation I deem the symbolic use to serve a legitimizing function. 
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4   Analysis 
4.1   The problem stream: A familiar problem in an 
unfamiliar environment 
It could be argued that an oil spill isn’t a condition that needs any prior 
introduction as a problem, we recognize it as a problem prima facie, much like a 
wildfire or a collapsed bridge. Nonetheless, there are still mechanisms at work in 
making conditions into problems. Here I’ll employ Kingdon’s MSF to consider 
how the DWH spill made the transition from condition to problem. Thereafter 
Boswell’s theory of knowledge utilization will be applied to aid the understanding 
of which problem definition was adopted by the government.  
The DWH explosion, and the oil spill that followed, is a textbook example of 
what Kingdon calls a focusing event—attention-grabbing incidents like an 
accident or a disaster, of which the DWH could be argued to be both (2003:94-
95). It generated immediate media attention, and continued to dominate the news 
feed for weeks after the disaster struck (Pew Research Center 2010a). The DWH 
disaster made the front page, engulfed in flames and with pillars of black smoke 
rising into the sky. In fact, although the threat of an oil spill lingered, there were 
no indications of an oil spill until four days after the initial explosion, writes Heidi 
Avery, deputy homeland security advisor to president Barack Obama (2010). 
Once the news of the spill broke the media attention didn’t die down, instead, 
after the rig had sunk into the ocean, the spill became the leading issue (Pew 
Research Center 2010b).  
Most oil spills never garner much attention (Birkland 1997:74; Birkland – 
Lawrence 2002:22), which speaks to both the extent and urgency of the DWH 
spill, and how it came to call attention to the issue as a focusing event. The 
disaster spanned many areas, from a search and rescue mission for the eleven 
missing crew members, to issues regarding oversight and rig inspection, to the 
technical failures of the drilling and safety mechanisms on the rig. In order for the 
problem to also be specified as an oil spill, additional help was needed. According 
to Kingdon, such help can come in the form of indicators (2003:98), which is also 
how it seems to have happened here. The indicators in this case were the oil flow 
rate estimates. Although oil spills probably didn’t need any prior introduction as a 
problem, with past experiences giving evidence to how devastating they can be, 
the indicators played an important role in making the oil spill an urgent problem. 
Once the oil spill became the focal point of the overarching problem, how the spill 
was to be understood came under contestation.  
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Initially, the U.S. government’s understanding of the spill was shaped largely 
by past experiences, writes David Bond, an anthropologist who studied the events 
surrounding the spill. Scientists with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), the main governmental advisory body on this issue, 
came to understand the DWH oil spill in the terms of the marine spills they’d 
encountered in the past. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez—an oil tanker—hit a reef in 
Prince William Sound, Alaska, causing oil to leak from the damaged hull of the 
ship and creating the second largest marine oil spill in U.S. history, second only to 
the DWH spill (Bond 2013:698). Stanley Rice, a former scientist with NOAA, 
provided an accurate statement when he said: “As the most studied oil spill in 
history, [the Exxon Valdez oil spill] has become a blueprint for how we're going 
to look at spills in the future” (Rice quoted by Lovgren 2004). The Exxon Valdez 
oil spill left 2250 kilometers of the Alaskan coastline covered in oil (Lovgren 
2004), and when it came to making sense of the DWH spill one problem 
definition that emerged was oil as a threat to the U.S. coast (Bond 2013:697–698), 
which could be thought strange. To understand why it is important to note the 
vastly different natures of the Exxon Valdez spill on one hand, and the Deepwater 
Horizon spill on the other. From the damaged hull of the Exxon Valdez an 
estimated 270,000 barrels of oil flowed into the surface layers of the ocean during 
the twelve hours it took to stop the leak; the Deepwater Horizon spill was nineteen 
times larger, lasted months, and occurred at an ocean depth of 1500 meters 
(Sylves – Comfort 2012:84; Bond 2013:699).  
Even though the volume or duration of the DWH spill wasn’t known at the 
outset, it was known that it was occurring in deepwater. Jane Lubchenco, together 
with some of her fellow scientists involved in the response efforts, describe how 
the DWH spill occurred in “an extreme ocean environment—deep, cold, dark, and 
high pressure” (Lubchenco et al. 2012:20212), rendering much of what was 
known about oil spills and the appropriate response useless. Therefore, new 
science that could make sense of the oil spill was in high demand (Lubchenco et 
al. 2012:20213). Some of this knowledge was to be produced by government 
scientists, but independent scientists at universities were brought in to aid in the 
response as well. Though it was clear that it was an oil spill of proportion, there 
was a divide in how the problem was to be understood among these two groups. 
On one side were the government and their scientists, on the other were 
independent scientists at universities, writes Bond. As understood by the 
government scientists, the problem of the DWH spill was not unlike other spills in 
the past, because of this they considered the oil to be a threat to be to the coast and 
beaches. Independent scientists however, were deeply concerned of the oil’s 
impact on the environment into which it was leaking—the deep ocean. The 
problem, according to the independent scientists should be understood as the 
potential threat of oil in deepwater, not as the surface oil that might make landfall, 
like the government scientists were proposing (2013:700–702). 
During incidents like this, where a large response needs to be coordinated 
between different government agencies, the U.S. government can set up 
something called a Unified Command. It could be likened to a government 
agency, but established for a limited amount of time only, and with fixed goals, 
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tasked mainly with coordinating a joint effort between different agencies and 
groups—like between government scientists at NOAA and independent scientists. 
During the DWH spill the Unified Command coordinated the response efforts and 
were therefore in charge of the cleanup response. While Unified Command 
reported to president Obama (Epperson 2011:8), and the president and his cabinet 
should be classified as a political organization, Unified Command should not. I’ve 
chosen to classify it as an action organization because of how it’s likely to be 
judged on its performance in spill mitigation, therefore it can also be expected to 
use knowledge instrumentally (Boswell 2009:47). 
While I can’t pinpoint who made the call, president, Unified Command, or 
other, they chose to go along with the understanding suggested by the government 
scientists, that of surface oil—and by extension its threat to the coast—as the focal 
matter of the disaster (Bond 2013:697–698). The scientists, who considered 
themselves “experts ‘in the science of oil spills’” (Bond 2013:699) and federal 
officials within Unified Command ignored the evidence of oil in deepwater during 
the first months of the disaster. Simply put, the available scientific expertise 
pulled two ways: toward oil as a threat to the coast, or toward oil as a threat to the 
environment of deepwater—and the first is how the government chose to 
understand the problem (Bond 2013:697–698).  
The decision to understand the problem in this way relied on knowledge from 
experts who had been involved in oil spill response before, even if it wasn’t 
specifically created for the situation in particular. For this reason, I’m reluctant to 
say that the knowledge utilization had no instrumental qualities, because I believe 
it did. Nevertheless, the knowledge also played a substantiating role. As stated 
earlier, expert knowledge can substantiate a position in a contested area by 
lending authority to the position in showing its scientific backing. Although both 
are symbolic uses of knowledge, the substantiating function is different from the 
legitimizing function. Instead of trying to gain legitimacy by showing that the 
decision making process has access to expert knowledge, it’s more closely linked 
to a specific issue and the expert knowledge is meant to underpin, or validate, one 
position over another (Boswell 2009:61–62, 87). In press conferences, and other 
instances where he addressed the public, president Obama stressed the following 
three points. One, that they had the best experts in the world working on the 
response efforts. Two, that Steven Chu, a scientist occupying a leading role in the 
response was a Nobel laureate. And three, that protection of the beaches and 
coastlines were their highest priority (2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d; 2010e; 
2010f). By doing this Obama could show that the way they’d chosen to 
understand the problem, as a threat to the coast, was a sound decision. What can 
be said is that there were two opposing understandings of the problem at play, 
from two groups of experts equally qualified in making such judgements and the 
government had to make a choice of how to understand the problem. Because the 
opposing understandings of the problem were played out in media, the 
government seem to have wanted to substantiate their position. 
In August something changed within Unified Command. After much 
advocacy by the independent scientists trying to shift focus away from the coast 
and toward deepwater, Unified Command published a report which stated that 
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going forward, they were also going to assess the subsurface—therefore also the 
deepwater—dimensions of the spill (OSAT 2010:xxvii). While this is a policy 
decision, and will be expanded on in the following section, it is also an indicator 
of how the understanding of the DWH oil spill seem to have changed within 
government since they went from a problem understanding that excluded 
subsurface oil, to one which included it. In other words, oil in deepwater became 
part of the problem understanding within Unified Command. 
4.2   The policy stream: From beaches to deepwater 
As stated in the previous section, there were multiple suggested problem 
definitions, and the solutions were no different. Much like within he problem 
stream, the policy stream held two competing policy proposals. Bond lays them 
out as follows. The first suggested solution, proposed by the government 
scientists, were different methods of coastal protection and surface containment. 
The second, courtesy of the independent scientists, was a two-stage process, the 
first of which was different methods of monitoring and collecting data on the oil. 
The quantity, type, and concentration of oil needed to be studied, and efforts in 
locating the oil, and predicting where it would go, needed to be made. Since the 
DWH spill was truly unique, knowledge on the topic of oil in deepwater was 
limited. Therefore, the suggestion from the independent scientists was to build 
knowledge first, to understand the actual scope of the problem, and form solutions 
around that knowledge later (2013:697–700).  
While it’s true that a deepwater spill like this one had never before been seen, 
it’s not the first time subsurface oil mitigation strategies had been up for 
discussion. Suggestions like those made by the independent scientists during the 
DWH spill, of more research into better mitigation strategies for subsea leaks, had 
also been made by the Nixon administration in the late 1960’s, in the wake of the 
Santa Barbara channel spill—currently the third largest marine spill in the U.S., 
ranking behind the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon spills—but few such 
advancements had been made in that area since (NCBP 2011:135). These ideas 
became relevant again during the response efforts to the DWH disaster, which 
follows Kingdon’s thinking of how ideas float around in scientific communities 
waiting for an opportunity to be put to action (2003:116–117). The same goes for 
the ideas proposed by the government science advisors—as discussed, they 
weren’t tailored for the situation either. Rather, the proposals were, as already 
suggested, the same ones that had been seen and put into action, during oil spills 
in the past (NCBP 2011:ix), suggesting that both the independent, and the 
government scientists proposed policy ideas already in the ether. 
Government scientists proposed different containment methods for keeping oil 
off the coast, and they were proposed not individually, but as a complement to 
each other. They included the use of skimmers, vessels that can remove surface 
oil; boom, floating barriers that keep surface oil from reaching sensitive areas; in-
situ burning, removal of the oil by igniting it and letting it burn off in a controlled 
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manner; and the use of dispersants, chemicals that dissolve oil (NCBP 2011:ix, 
151–153, 160, 167-169; NOAA 2018). Dispersants were one of the most 
prominent methods and will be discussed further below. 
Early on, the use of dispersants—chemicals sprayed on the surface slicks, and 
later injected underwater at the wellhead—was floated. Dispersants do not remove 
the oil, but changes its physical form by breaking it down into droplets that 
disperse in the water column (Ramseur 2010:6). Removing the oil from the 
surface in this way makes it less of a threat for beaches, coastal areas, and certain 
animals like birds, which would otherwise be threatened by the slick (NOAA 
2018). The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling (NCBP) explain how the use of dispersants was considered 
highly controversial from the beginning, partly because of its potential toxicity, 
and partly because of its unknown effects in the conditions of deepwater 
(2011:143–144). Dispersants were used to a remarkable extent during the DWH 
disaster and it was effective in dissolving the oil and therefore preventing it from 
ever reaching the coast (2011:168). However, once oil is dispersed, it’s becomes 
too diluted to remove with other response methods, and whilst dissolved oil is 
thought to biodegrade faster than crude oil, it also spreads both vertically and 
horizontally through the water column much quicker, and dispersed oil is still 
toxic. Some of the oil had already been dispersed naturally as a result of the 
immense pressure at the site of the Macondo well, 1500 meters below the ocean 
surface, where the pressure forced the oil to break down into smaller 
components—hydrocarbons, the main building blocks of crude oil—and spread 
throughout the ocean (Bond 2013:696). 
During the first weeks of the disaster, independent scientists started noticing 
changes to the ocean, confirming the fears they had held since the beginning. 
What they observed were changes in the chemistry of the ocean—later explained 
to be due to the waste products produced by microorganisms feeding on the 
dispersed oil (Bond 2013:700–701). What has been described as deepwater 
plumes of dispersed oil—35 kilometers long—could be detected by the 
independent scientists, threatening the marine life of the gulf (NCBP 2011:182; 
Ramseur 2010:14). Scientists working within the Unified command were not 
interested in monitoring oil in deepwater if nothing could be done about it. 
Against the suggestions from the independent scientists, which was to locate the 
oil and research its impacts on the deep ocean—the environment into which the 
oil was leaking, the government scientists sought only to quantify oil which they 
knew how to collect and do away with, writes Bond. They described their actions 
as seeking operational facts to help them problem-solve, which suggests that they 
had instrumental knowledge utilization in mind during the process (2013:701–
702).  
As time and response efforts went on, and the flow of oil could finally be 
stopped, independent scientists continued to investigate and make reports of the 
oil still remaining in the water column, dispersed or otherwise. With the 
immediate threat of oil spilling into the gulf at a rate higher than 52,700 barrels—
8 million liters—a day no longer present (NCBP 2011:167), what the independent 
scientists had been saying could gradually come into focus. In August 2010, 
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roughly a month after the well had been fitted with a temporary seal, NOAA 
published a report outlining the fate of the oil spilled, and it was made clear that 
the vast majority of the oil never made it to the surface, threatening the coastline 
(NOAA 2010). With the immediate threat of an ongoing spill no longer looming, 
the independent scientists were able to bring attention to their policy proposals. 
From having their results ignored, publically discredited and being instructed 
by the NOAA not to speak to the press about their findings, the independent 
scientists were able to gain recognition back from those within Unified Command. 
At this point the peer-reviewed evidence the independent scientists had published 
started to pile up and became increasingly difficult to ignore, writes Elizabeth 
Bradshaw, sociologist. Only then, in late August, did the government scientists 
recognize the existence of the underwater plumes (2012:177–180, 185). Jonathan 
Ramseur, specialist in environmental policy, speaks of the same dismissal of the 
independent scientists’ findings in his report to the U.S. Congress (2010:14). 
During the same time, the government scientists were tasked with putting together 
a plan outlining the subsurface oil monitoring that were going to take place going 
forward, coupled with a need to find additional methods for addressing the 
subsurface oil still remaining (OSAT 2010:xxvii; Zukunft 2010). This sudden 
change indicated a major shift in the government policy toward the DWH oil spill 
response, from first focusing solely on coastal protection, and not wanting to do 
any monitoring of subsurface conditions if there wasn’t a strategy for immediate 
mitigation available, to being open to and suggesting monitoring and investigation 
of new strategies themselves. It seems like these policy proposals were preceded 
by them also gaining traction in the scientific community, as peer-reviewed 
findings accumulated (Bradshaw 2012:155). I’ll return to this later in the chapter. 
Unified Command acts a lot like a government agency. In this case they were 
the main government organization in charge of the oil spill response. Given that 
Unified Command takes on many of the characteristics of an action organization, 
they can be expected to use knowledge instrumentally—to generate good results 
which help them reach the goal they were established to meet. Therefore, the 
organization is also expected to draw on expert knowledge in an instrumental 
fashion (Boswell 2009:13), since this is how they can improve their output, and 
reach their goal. Behind the first policy they decided to implement—the one 
considering the surface dimensions of the spill only and therefore focusing on 
coastal protection as the response—I believe the knowledge utilization to have 
been both instrumental and substantiating. From Bond’s study it was learned that 
Unified Command had an overriding preference for operational facts at the start, 
facts which would aid them in the cleanup. With the technologies for deepwater 
collection not very well developed—in my understanding next to nonexistent—
they set a focus on the oil that could be remedied with the knowledge available to 
them. While the knowledge wasn’t the most updated to fit the situation, but rather 
what had been learned from previous disasters of a similar type—in those cases 
marine oil spills, which arguably can be considered too vast a category—it was 
still effective in mitigating what was their initial focus, the surface portion of the 
spill. In other words, given their goal of coastal protection, they used available 
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expert knowledge to reach those goals, and therefore the knowledge can be said to 
have been used instrumentally. 
Even if their initial policy was not effective in responding to the subsurface 
dimensions of the spill, it was never destined to, since it was never part of the 
problem definition adapted by Unified Command at the start. While some 
independent scientists voiced concerns about the lack of attention to the 
subsurface oil, they weren’t disputing the effectiveness of the Unified Command 
methods for their intended purpose—coastal protection—but rather disputing the 
effectiveness of the response to the oil spill as a whole. Therefore, even though it 
might seem like the initial strategy was on shaky grounds scientifically, given 
what it was implemented for it did serve its purpose in improving the output—in 
this case, cleaning up the surface portion of the spill. 
The August news that Unified Command were going to include subsurface oil 
in the response going forward (Zukunft 2010) might not have entirely relied on 
the independent scientists’ findings however. Independent scientists had been 
trying to bring attention to the subsurface oil since the first weeks of the spill—
their worries backed up by findings from early on (Ramesur 2010:14). Unified 
Command scientists—government scientists—disputed these findings, and the 
proposals to monitor and target oil in deepwater continued to be ignored—until 
the peer-reviewed evidence piled up and could no longer be pushed aside 
(Bradshaw 2012:155, 179, 183). But it wasn’t until government scientists within 
NOAA conducted their own testing and confirmed the independent scientists’ 
findings that Unified Command really started to pay attention (BBC 2010). Once 
the severity of the deepwater conditions were brought into focus, the expert 
knowledge played an instrumental role in shaping the subsea strategy for 
monitoring and mitigation, released and employed by Unified Command, even 
though it had been ignored to start with. 
4.3   The political stream: Fighting for legitimacy 
That political organizations are those who strive to generate legitimacy from their 
environment by using expert knowledge in symbolic ways, is some of what has 
been presented from Boswell’s theory of knowledge utilization so far (2009:13). 
Kingdon has brought attention to how conditions within the political stream have 
the ability to affect what issues rise to the agenda, and by extension, what 
decisions are made (2003:162–163). Among the political conditions impacting the 
events surrounding the DWH disaster sits the newly elected president Obama, 
who was just 15 months into his first term when disaster struck in the Mexican 
gulf on April 20 2010 (Rodrigues 2017). Presidents can be assumed to want to say 
in office, and this is an assumption I’m going to make here—maybe strengthened 
by the fact that Obama did indeed run for re-election after his first term was up. 
Because of this wish to stay in power, one of their main concerns should be to 
sustain legitimacy toward the electorate, as to not lose their confidence, and thus 
also their vote. Out of the two organizational types provided by Boswell, the 
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president and those closest to him—his cabinet, and further what is often just 
referred to as “The White House”—can be classified as a political organization, 
and should therefore take steps to gain legitimacy through symbolic use of expert 
knowledge (2009:61–62). 
While Obama’s exact involvement in the decisions made is not entirely clear 
to me, he did oversee the response at large and was needed to grant permission for 
certain operations where so required. But maybe most importantly, while the 
president might not have taken direct part in the cleanup process, he was the one 
that blame was probably going to be placed on should it not go well. Again, the 
president is utmost concerned with legitimacy, and part in keeping that legitimacy 
is keeping the public at ease by demonstrating that the government is well versed 
and skilled in crisis management. Below I’ll present two instances where the 
concern for legitimacy shaped the events. 
The first is the deployment of boom, floating devices used to keep oil off the 
coast. It proved not to be the most effective strategy for spill containment, but it 
did make the gulf state residents happy. NCBP wrote the following in their report 
to president Obama: “Responders knew that in deploying boom they were often 
responding to the politics of the spill rather than the spill itself. And the miles of 
boom along the coastline still did not prevent oil from washing up on the shore” 
(2011:154). At one point Unified Command gave orders to comply with the 
demands for more boom from the residents, even though boom wasn’t the right 
strategy in those cases (2011:153). Boom was ineffective, but popular, as it was 
the only containment effort actually visible to the gulf state residents. They 
couldn't see the efforts carried out far offshore, but vessels laying boom close to 
their shores gave them a sense of protection (NCBP 2011:151). This here is a 
clear example of when political conditions, such as a wish to keep the public 
happy, override what’s scientifically motivated. The expert knowledge was in this 
case not used instrumentally. This combined with the continued emphasis on 
having employed the absolute best researchers to aid in the response, it seems not 
all expert knowledge was used to its full potential, and therefore a portion of those 
statements were, in very broad strokes, just paying lip service to the public. Thus 
the expert knowledge also served a legitimizing function. 
The second relates back to the disagreements between government and 
independent scientists. Although the independent scientists’ ideas were 
incorporated in the problem understanding the policies in the end, it wasn’t until 
the NOAA confirmed the findings made by these independent scientists that these 
ideas were brought to consideration. What follows here is speculative, but part of 
the fight for legitimacy from the president’s side surely involves demonstrating 
that the organizations and institutions within the state apparatus function and are 
able of protecting their citizens during a time of crisis—a time during which it 
would certainly look bad for a president to turn against experts and advisors 
within government. Considering how the disagreements between the two groups 
of scientists already had played out very publically in the press, it would be to add 
insult to injury for the president to also start to question and depart from the 
advice of his own—the government scientists. 
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5   Discussion and conclusion 
In the months during which the spill played out, it seems as though there was a 
shift not only in policy, but also in the problem understanding. While the streams 
of problems and policy are separate, they can join together when the time is 
right—when an arising problem coincides with a policy proposal already out there 
(Kingdon 2003:194–195). I believe the shift in policy to have occurred in this 
way. While the understanding of the oil in deepwater as a problem in itself existed 
within the independent research community from early on, it also needed to be 
established within the U.S. government and Unified Command, since they were in 
charge of not only coordinating but also devising the spill response.  
At the start, the problem understanding within Unified Command was that of 
oil as a threat to the coast lines, and the independent scientists’ attempts to shift 
the focus to deepwater were initially futile. But as time went on and the evidence 
accumulated, Unified Command changed their problem understanding and policy 
to include the subsurface dimensions of the oil spill. When NOAA realized 
subsurface dimensions as part of the problem—from conducting their own testing 
on the matter—this opened a policy window for what the independent scientists 
had been proposing for a long time. The policy suggestion of subsea assessment 
found its footing with this policy window, and it could be so that it was propelled 
to the decision agenda because the findings finally were verified by NOAA and 
thus fulfilled the government’s assumed wish to rely on government scientists for 
legitimacy reasons. 
While not all experts involved were in support of the initial problem 
understanding and response policy, they were still shaped by the suggestions 
made by experts in an instrumental fashion. The policy shift was no different, the 
new policy also relied on expert knowledge, with the hopes of improving the 
output. This was not unexpected, seeing as the Unified Command is more of an 
action organization than a political organization. Throughout the process, traces of 
substantiating knowledge could be found as well, both from government scientists 
affirming their choices by referencing their past experiences with the Exxon 
Valdez spill, and from president Obama who often brought up how highly 
educated the experts were. There were also signs of legitimizing knowledge use, 
although more indirect. Expert knowledge was, as stated above, referenced 
throughout the process, but the cleanup response didn’t always coincide with what 
was scientifically motivated. The use of boom is an example of this—not the most 
effective but liked by the residents and therefore it kept being deployed. 
The government seem to have been very concerned about their legitimacy 
during this time, which can be seen not only in the use of boom, but maybe also in 
what group of experts they chose to listen to. Although the independent scientists 
were the ones who pioneered the idea of oil in deepwater as a potential threat, and 
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suggested strategies for mitigation which were indeed implemented at the end, the 
ideas didn’t really garner attention from the government agencies until they had 
been tested by NOAA—the government scientists. It seems as though the 
government had a wish to stick with the knowledge provided by their own experts 
only, even though the independent scientists were equally qualified. 
In sum, the shift was not a shift in knowledge use. Instead the policy shift can 
be understood as a shift in the problem understanding, which led to the policy 
shift when there was an opening for different ideas to become attached to this new 
understanding of the problem. Throughout the process the organizations behaved 
in expected ways in regard to their use of expert knowledge. Knowledge was used 
instrumentally throughout the entire process, with instances of legitimizing and 
substantiating use running parallel. The study also revealed something which I 
found rather interesting: the government’s reluctance to listen to the independent 
scientists. Though the government invited them to advice on the disaster since 
they knew they didn’t have the resources to produce all the new science needed 
themselves, it seems as though it wasn’t enough for the independent scientists to 
present their research to gain the attention of policy makers. Even though the 
scientists within the two groups shared the same education, and thus to some 
extent the same expertise, something else was needed for their knowledge to be 
considered viable. If the assigned weight of a scientist’s findings is dependent on 
the scientist’s affiliation, and if the sensitive nature of a disaster makes politicians 
increasingly concerned with legitimacy and therefore more likely to stick to 
advice coming from government agencies, are areas in need of further 
exploration. 
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